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y paper has two aims: to outline a diagnosis of the ills of social
science, and to argue for the attractiveness of sociobiology as
an alternative to conventional social science. Both of these
aims can be attained by reflecting on the same considerations. Indeed,
since sociobiology is not yet a discipline to be respected for any actual
explanatory successes and predictive strengths, one of the strongest
arguments on its behalf would be to show that it is free from the ills
of conventional social science. What are these ills? Their symptoms are
the failure of social science since its inception (at least as early as Plato
and Thucydides) to have produced anything like the laws which natural
science has produced. It is not just that there is nothing in social science
approaching Newtonian physics, or the chemistry of the elements, or
even the generalizations of biology: Social science has not even produced the earliest step in a sequence of improvable generalizations. It
has no history of a succession of generalizations each deeper in its explanatory power and more precise in its predictive strength than its
predecessor. An adequate explanation of why this is so turns out to be
a good argument for sociobiology, and I shall try to give both the explanation and the argument.
There are two widespread objections to my diagnosis. The first is that
social science is not or ought not to be the search for causal regularities,
and the second is that in one or another discipline, say economics, laws
or their first approximation have already been found. The first objection supposes that the aim of social science is to provide emotionally
satisfying intelligibility, and not predictively useful knowledge. Such
useful knowledge can be attained only by research that uncovers laws
or their improvable first approximations. The social science disciplines
must uncover the causal determinants or underlying factors that generate
the human behavior they purport to explain . Identifying these factors,
and discovering the relations that hold between them, is just what the

1

64-5 Y KAC\JSE SCHOLAR

Syracuse Scholar (1979-1991), Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 9

search for laws or their approximations is all about. The difference between those who demand predictively useful knowledge from social
science and those who seek subjective understanding or comprehension without improvable control over human behavior is not a mere
matter of taste, a difference between the practically minded and a literary
or humane approach. It is an epistemological difference: The former
hold that putative explanations do not count as knowledge unless they
can be tested against subsequent experiences, experiences not merely
compatible with the explanation's contents, but whose occurrence and
character we are correctly led to expect by the explanation. Their opponents hold that such standards for knowledge are only appropriate
for the natural sciences. In what follows I assume that this
epistemological double standard is no more justifiable than are double
standards in ethics and moral philosophy. To the second objection, that
laws have already been discovered by one or another of the social
sciences, I can only reply that in every case these alleged laws have not
been improved in explanatory systematization, predictive power and
precision, or clarity of expression even when, as in economics, they have
been the common coin of their disciplines for two hundred years.

An earlier explanation and its limitations
Most empiricists have considered the absence of laws of human
behavior to be in principle temporary and have identified two obstacles
to discovering laws or their precursors: First, the sheer complexity of
the subject matter: Human beings and human groups are such frightfully complicated systems that a scientific understanding of them is not
to be expected until long after we have acquired such understanding
of their simpler biological and physical constituents. Since our scientific theories about the chemistry and biology of the subsystems that
compose human beings are far from complete, it may seem reasonable
to counsel patience, to place the empiricist's embarrassment about the
absence of laws in proper perspective, and to await the outcome of further research by able social scientists. Second, there are moral and social
impediments to undertaking experiments on human subjects under conditions closed to all interference with the phenomena under study.
Treating people as persons is incompatible with treating them as subjects of an experimental protocol, as the work of researchers both malign
and benign has revealed. Since we cannot do the sorts of experiments
we would in principle want to do on human beings, we cannot expect
to acquire easily or perhaps at all the laws that govern their behavior.
The trouble with this explanation is that it hinges on a dubious
premise. It presumes that if the complexity of a subject matter and its
resistance to experiment increase, the rate of progress in the scientific
understanding of the subject matter cannot also increase. But the history
of natural science shows this to be plainly false. Over the long run, and
in the recent short run, the subject matter of natural science has increased in complexity and in resistance to experiment at accelerating
rates, and yet progress in systematically explaining and reliably controlling these phenomena has accelerated even more. Since complexity
and experimental recalcitrance have not impeded progress in natural
science, they cannot be the sole explanation for the failure of social
science. Fully to explain the failure of social science to produce laws
requires showing why such feamres constirute obstacles in these

https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol4/iss2/9

2

Rosenberg: The Human Sciences: Obstacles and Opportunities

THE HUMAN SCIENCES-65

disciplines when they do not in others. The full explanation must show
that the failure reflects a matter of fact about the subject matter of social
science and not a logical obstacle to the very possibility of scientific
knowledge of human behavior. For aside from the fact that no empirical
social scientists will actually be detained by the impossibility proof*
which such an explanation would constitute, the result would only be
more and harder questions to answer: Viz., what is it about human
beings that logically or metaphysically exempts their behavior from scientific systematization? What difference in kind is there between sentient
creatures on the one hand and matter in motion on the other which
results in this impossibility? Taking these questions seriously is less attractive than accepting the lame explanation that appeals to nothing
more than complexity and experimental recalcitrance.
In fact, the full explanation of the failure of social science will have
to identify a false belief whose deleterious effects on progress is limited
to these disciplines. Of course the belief cannot be repudiated at the
cost of excluding the logical possibility of nomological social sciencebased on genuine scientific laws and not mere accidental
generalizations-altogether, but it nonetheless must be central among
our beliefs and highly ramified in its influence on research strategy.
For only such a belief can explain both why all and only the social
sciences are equally unlikely to hit upon improvable generalizations,
and why no one has yet detected this erroneous belief and repudiated it.

Generalizations, classifications,
and the organization of knowledge
in the natural sciences
The social sciences are not the only disciplines ever to have lacked
general statements that successively approximate to nomological status.
Behind each of the so-called mature natural sciences there stands a
predecessor which reflects the same history of frustration the social
sciences evince. In each of these disciplines the chief cause of fruitlessness
was the failure to "carve nature at the joints": Each of the natural
sciences organized the items in its domain into classes that were causally
hetergeneous. That is, the classificatory labels used did not bring
together items which shared a manageably small set of causal determinants and consequents, and so none of the items could be made the
subject of causal regularities. Here is a simple illustration of the obstacles
erected by a classification that fails to "carve nature at the joints." Suppose we use the term 'fish' to designate any aquatic creature. This
designation is not far from ordinary usage, even among the biologically
sophisticated. If now we enquire after the method of respiration of
fish by examining what we can catch with a hook and worm, we may
conclude that fish respire through the use of gills. But once we discover
whales and porpoises we shall have to revise the generalization to include lungs: Fish respire by the use of gills or lungs. On the discovery
of jellyfish, we shall have to make a further emendation: Fish respire
through the use of gills or lungs or by osmotic diffusion. The discovery
of squid, of various bottom dwelling shellfish, of starfish and sea
cucumbers, and so on, will complicate the generalization further, as
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proof is a proof of impossibzlity.
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will that of microorganisms properly designated as aquatic creatures.
The result will be a useless generalization about a vast disjunction of
alternative respiratory mechanisms, a generalization incapable of
systematic explanation from a small number of more theoretical laws,
and powerless to enable us to predict the breathing mechanism of the
next creature we pull from the sea. This generalization, even if completed by an exhaustive study of all types of aquatic creatures, will be
no law. The culprit is obvious: The term 'fish,' when defined as 'aquatic
creature,' does not designate a simple kind of organism, but a very
heterogeneous collection of different types of organisms, with different
properties, that behave in accordance with different causal regularities.
This causal heterogeneity is characteristic of a category that does not
" carve nature at the joints." But if we substitute for 'aquatic creature'
some more restricted definition like 'scaly aquatic egg-laying bony
vertebrate ' we will be able to formulate a generalization about how fish
breathe that is not riddled with exceptions, that can itself be explained
by appeal to a manageable biological theory, and that will enable us
to make correct predictions about how the next such creature we discover
breathes. And though no doubt not strictly true because of obscure exceptions like the lungfish, our generalization seems improvable in the
direction of greater precision and accuracy .
Each of the revolutions in the natural sciences started with the overthrow of such causally heterogeneous categories in favor of a system of
types of items, properties, objects , events, and states that did turn out
to bear manageable, regular, causal relations to one another. When this
happens the sciences have uncovered their appropriate natural kinds:
the kind terms that are causally homogeneous, that do "carve nature
at the joints, '' and that therefore figure in improvable regularities and
ultimately in laws. Some obvious examples come readily to mind : The
Newtonian revolution, for example, repudiated the distinction between
terrestrial and celestial motion in favor of a distinction among the natural
kinds of rest and accelerated motion. Modern chemistry stans with the
replacement of phlogiston by oxygen. Atomic theory owes its real beginnings to the periodic table of the elements, which finally brought the
objects of chemistry into a system of types related to each other in ways
eventually explained by microphysical principles. Deciding on the
natural kinds in the domain of a discipline is inseparable from discovering the first approximations to laws in that discipline, because a natural
kind just is a kind that falls under causal regularities. Thus, the discovery
of improvable regularities goes hand in hand with the elaboration of
a descriptive vocabulary for expressing them , and the suitability of that
vocabulary to the tasks of the discovery is as much a factual matter as
a theoretical one. Deciding on a kind vocabulary for a scientific theory
is not merely a terminological matter-conventional, empirically
neutral, and made on considerations of convenience alone . A distinct
and useful science must embody m:mageable generalizations, qualifications , computational intricacy, and sheer numbers; and such laws cannot be made if the descriptive vocabulary of the subject is a jury-rigged ,
gerrymandered patchwork.
The contingent fact that scientists got the natural kinds of their
disciplines wrong helps to explain the failures of physics, chemistry,
and biology before their scientific revolutions in the seventeenth, eighteenth , and nineteenth centuries, respectively. The failures of the social
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sciences are to be explained in the same way, by finding fault with their
descriptive classes and categories, their conceptual scheme. Such fault
has been found many times before by social scientists ready to provide
the correct set of natural kinds with which to describe human behavior.
Innovators advocating neologisms are nothing new to the long-suffering
social sciences. The trouble with their proposals is that they give no
reason independent of their neologistic alternative for the failure of the
conventional vocabulary. Nor do they obviate such reasons by providing
for actual generalizations any more improvable than the ones they are
meant to replace .
Like others, I locate the failure of social science in its categorical and
conceptual commitments. These commitments reflect shared false beliet~
about the natural kinds into which human behavior and its determinants
fall. Their falsity can be shown by reflecting on contemporary biology
and its conceptual foundations. Such an argument will be independent
of any issue controversial in the social sciences or their philosophy.
Moreover, it has an important positive upshot for what the natural kinds
of human behavior really are.

Toward a new explanation of the
failure of the social sciences:
Five premises
My argument begins with five premises, which I shall state and then
defend.
1. The social sciences are all resolutely intentional: They classify the
behavior to be explained as various sorts of actions, and the variables
that explain it as various sorts and combinations of desires and beliefs.
2. All definitions of intentional predicates must eventually resort to
their exemplification by Homo sapiens. Intentional description of the
states or behavior of nonhumans is either metaphorical or rests on
analogies between such behavior and paradigmatic human
intentionality.
3. Homo sapiens constitutes a biological species. (This is the least
controversial of my premises.)
4. The coherence of biological theory, and in particular the theory
of natural selection, dictates that species names are not kind terms like
'planet' or 'oxygen,' but are names of spatiotemporally restricted, particular objects, like 'the earth' or 'the Eiffel Tower' or 'the family
Medici' -an object, albeit a scattered one , just as a species is scattered.
5. But no spatiotemporally restricted particulars can figure in general
laws . Only "qualitive" predicates may be so used. At best, names can
figure in accidental regularities that explain nothing.
From these five premises it follows that:
6. Homo sapiens names a spatiotemporally restricted, particular,
though scattered, object, just as 'the family Medici' does.
And that:
7. There are no laws about Homo sapiens. There are no laws about
causal relations between intentional states or between intentional states
and behavior, however that behavior is described.
In other words, there are no laws in the social sciences; nor any prospect of them so long as we persist in describing their subject matter

Published by SURFACE, 1983

5

68-SYRACUSE SCHOLAR

Syracuse Scholar (1979-1991), Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 9

in terms that are spatiotemporally restricted, that do not pick out natural
kinds, that do not carve the nature of human behavior at the joints.
Premise (1): The social sciences are intentional
Premise (1), that the social sciences are resolutely intentional, will
go largely unchallenged. The social sciences are not concerned with the
topography of human behavior, with the spatiotemporal displacement
of the human body: They are interested in bodily motions under descriptions that show the displacement to be explainable in terms of desire
and belief.
Although they do not always use these terms, the determinants of
human behavior social scientists search for are always cognates or variants
of desire and belief. For example, economics appeals to expectations,
i.e., beliefs about the future, and preferences, i.e., relative judgments
of desirability. Social psychology may explain prejudice as an attitude
caused by the combination of beliefs and desires-that is, desire to avoid
or even harm someone falsely believed to be inferior or dangerous.
Cultural anthropology explains a ritual in terms of meaning for its participants; and meaning, with its roots in language, is perhaps the most
intentional notion of all. Even macrosocial theories make implicit appeal to intentional variables. For example, macroeconomic theories trade
on implicit attributions of the desire for money balances, and beliefs
about interest rates which affect these balances. Similarly, even so antipsychological a theory as Durkheim's account of suicide rates in terms
of the strength of forces of social integration rests on the identification
and recognition of those forces by the individuals whose suicides make
up the statistical rates he purports to explain. 1
It is important to note that the use of the term 'intentional' here
connotes more than just purposeful, or goal-directed behavior. Intentional behavior is indeed goal-directed or, as philosophers have called
it, "teleological." But it is more than that, and philosophers employ
the term 'intentional' to label that further property of human action
and its determinants-desire and belief-which distinguishes them from
other goal-directed processes like photosynthesis, or the feedback regulation of the mammalian iris, or the imprinting behavior of a duckling.
An intentional state has content, it is ''directed'' toward a proposition
or an object; it is "about" something. When an agent has a belief,
there is a proposition he believes; he stands in a certain relation to that
proposition: the relation of belief. And the difference between two
beliefs is in the propositions they ''contain.'' Similarly, when an agent
has a certain desire, there is a proposition he desires to be true, typically
a proposition to the effect that some object or state of affairs is attained
or obtained. Philosophers express this special character of mental states,
their "aboutness," by the label "intentionality." The intentionality
of psychological states like belief and desire consists in their having content, being directed at ways things are, or might be.
Premise (2): Intentionality in the social sciences is an attribute restricted
to one species, Homo sapiens
Premise (2) of my argument is philosophically the most controversial and the hardest to expound in a way that combines plausibility with
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1. There are some theories in
behavioral science, and some
macrosocial theories that are not
committed to the intentionality of
behavior. But they are fewer than
one might think. About the only
clear case of such a theory is Skinnerian operant or instrumental
learning theory. This theory is
teleological, but it does avoid appeals to the content, directedness,
or representational aspects of
psychological states or the behavior
they explain. Accordingly, it is exempt from my criticism, and its
chief result , the law of effect, may
well turn out to be an improvable
approximation to a law. On the
other hand, if the Skinnerian
research program is judged a
failure, my argument will not explain the failure. Macrosocial
theories as diverse as econometric
models and Durkheimian
hypotheses of social integration are
sometimes supposed to be utterly
divorced from hypotheses about
the intentions of individual agents.
While they might be logically independent of any panicular intentions attributed by underlying
theory to human beings, to the extent that they have any
microeconomic or socialpsychological foundations , these
theories are firmly committed to
treating human behavior as intentional action.
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2. This attitude is best illustrated
in a passage by Norman Malcolm :
"Since it has nothing like a
human face and body, it makes no
sense to say of a tree , or an electronic computer, that it is looking
or pointing or fetching something
(of course one could always invent
a sense for such expressions) .. . .
Things which do not have the
human form , or anything like it,
not merely do not but cannot
satisfy the criteria for thinking. I
am trying to bring out part of
what Wittgenstein meant when he
said 'we only say of a human being and what is like one that it
think ,' and 'The human body is
the best picture of the human
soul.'" (" Knowledge of Other
Minds'' in Knowledge and Certainty [Englewood Cliffs, N .J. :
Prentice Hall , 1963]), pp. 135-36.

Intentional states
represent expectations
as well as facts.
Expectations may
represent our attitudes
about facts, but they
are not factual.

Intentional states are
specific. Unlike
generalizations, they
do not permit substitutions of terms.
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accessibility to the nonspecialist. But because of its centrality to a great
deal of contemporary philosophy, its presuppositions and the argument
for it are worth stating in some detail. The bare bones of the argument
are that intentional states, or rather the terms we employ to refer to
them, have a logical or semantic property which no nonintentional
terms, such as those found in any of the physical or life sciences, have.
This means we cannot define the terms of our intentional theories by
reference to nonintentional phenomena, like behavior or neural states,
and that we cannot tell when someone is in a particular mental state,
like belief or desire, merely by observing his behavior, its setting, or
by making any inference from what we know about the fine structure
of his neurophysiological states. This leaves open the question of how
we do make such attributions, and on what grounds. My answer, and
that of other philosophers (with whom I am not otherwise in
philosophical sympathy), is that our definitions of intentional states
are given ultimately in ostension, by pointing to paradigmatic cases of
human behavior that we take without question to evince such states.
We do this after much stage setting of course, and we do it implicitly. 2
And when those of us (including me) who are willing to extend intentionality to monkeys, machines, and Martians do so, we do it on the
strength of the analogy between their behavior and that of Homo sapiens in the same or similar settings. The flesh to be put on the bare
bones in the discussion to follow should not be mistaken for the whole
body of the argument.

I

ntentional states have a property which distinguishes them from
all other states, and in particular from merely physical, or even goaldirected states of nonintentional teleological systems, plants,
thermostats, organs of the body, or lower forms of biological life. It
is a property which hinges on the fact that they "contain" or are
"directed" to propositions about the way things are or could be. The
property they have is that when we change the descriptions of the states
of affairs they "contain" in ways that seem innocuous, we turn true
attributions of belief into false ones. For instance, consider the
presumably true statements that (D) Oedipus desires to marry Jocasta,
and (B) Oedipus believes thatJocasta is the Queen. These two sentences
report relations of desire and belief between Oedipus and the propositions, respectively, that Oedipus marries Jocasta and that Jocasta is the
Queen. These two statements are the contents of Oedipus's intentional
states. ButJocasta is not only the Queen, she is also Oedipus's mother,
so anything true of the Queen or ofJocasta is true of Oedipus's mother,
and we should be able to refer to Jocasta indifferently as the Queen
and as Oedipus's mother. But when we refer to her as Oedipus's mother
in describing Oedipus's desires and beliefs we produce the presumably
false statements that (D' ) Oedipus desires to marry his mother , and
(.8") Oedipus believes that his mother is the Queen.
By making innocent substitutions of terms that refer to the very same
objects we have turned truths into falsehoods . But this is something
we simply cannot do to any expressions that report nonintentional relations, such as those characteristic of physics, chemistry, or biology. I
may refer to the earth and the moon in any of an infinite number of
ways, and the statement that their gravitational attraction varies as the
inverse of the square of the distance between them will be true no matter
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how I refer to them. Any statement about the physical or chemical properties and relations of the Hope diamond will remain true no matter
how I refer to it, as the largest diamond in the world, as the stone that
brings bad luck to its owners, as the only gem mined in Katanga in
March of 1914, and so on. Similarly, the goal of photosynthesis is the
production of polysaccharides, and this statement will remain true no
matter how I refer to it, as starch, as the substance with the chemical
formula (CH 20)0 as the chief constituent of papier-mache, as the cause
of cellulite, or as the chief ingredient of my favorite junk food. But
such substitutions are not permissible in intentional statements for they
may, and often do, change a true statement about an agent's beliefs
or desires into a false one.

T

his special logical feature of intentional states has important consequences for the ways we identify and distinguish them. We
can in fact do so only by reference to the propositions they
contain, to the states of affairs they represent. To see this consider again
the statement that (B/) Oedipus believes that his mother is the Queen.
The only temptation we have to suppose that (B/) is true is that at the
end of Oedipus Rex Oedipus does come to believe that Jocasta, the
Queen, is his mother. In consequence he plucks his eyes out. But this
belief at the end of the play is a different belief from that which Oedipus
has in the middle of the action. His belief that Jocasta is the Queen,
(B), is a different belief from (B/ ). The difference in the beliefs is based
on the difference in the contents of the beliefs. It is not based on the
facts of the matter, which have not changed throughout the play. It
is not the case that at some point in the play it was false that Oedipus's
mother was the Queen and that later it became true. Accordingly, we
cannot identify Oedipus's beliefs by reference to the facts aboutJocasta.
It was not on these facts that his beliefs depended, and it is not by
appeal to them that we can identify his beliefs or trace the changes in
them . Much the same can be said about his desires. Jocasta was the
object of his desire, but were he to have been asked whether his mother
was the object of his desire, he would have rejected the suggestion
violently. YetJocasta was his mother. Accordingly, his desire cannot
be identified or disclosed by any examination of the actual person at
whom it was "aimed," but only by appeal to its content, a proposition about that person. This is even clearer in the case of unattainable
desires: Ponce de Le6n desired to reach the fountain of youth. But we
cannot find out what he desired by any inspection of the fountain of
youth or his actual physically describable relation to it for there is no
such thing as the fountain of youth. We can only identify his desire
by its content.
If the identity of an intentional state is determined by the proposition it contains and if beliefs can be false and desires unattained, we
cannot decide what beliefs or desires an agent has by finding out whether
any proposition about the world independent of his intentions is true
or false. Of course we can and do discover peoples' intentional states-by
asking them-but this method is itself intentional. Their responses to
our questions will only be counted as replies, as the utterance of meaningful speech, as actions, if we assume that they are sincere and that
they understand the meaning of the language with which we put our
questions; that is, if we assume that they desire to answer truthfully
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Unlike physical states,
intentional states are
relative. They may
alter even though their
related facts do not
change.

A scrutiny of its objects alone cannot
identify a belief or a
desire.

Therefore, a knowledge
of facts independent of
intentions cannot
reveal the truth or
falsity of intentional
states, or of the human
behavior motivated by
intentional states.
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Therefore, it is only
minimally useful to attempt to itfentify the
causes of action in
terms of its effects in
action.
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and believe that the utterances they emit will attain this desire. In other
words, our normal means of identifying the causes of actions are in terms
of their effects, the actions themselves; and the identification of an
event, a movement of the body, as an action presupposes the attribution to it of intentional causes: A bodily movement is an action only
if it is caused by intentional states, a desire and/ or a belief. Now, there
is nothing improper about this intentional circle so far as our everyday
nonscientific purposes are concerned. But social science seeks to sharpen
its explanations and predictions of human behavior beyond commonsense levels of accuracy. Therefore, it must break out of this intentional circle: We must find a way of identifying movements as actions
without assuming that the movements were caused by intentional states;
we must find a way of identifying intentional states without appeal to
their effects in action. The reason is simple and can be illustrated by
considering the explanation and prediction of how alcohol thermometers
work.

T

o explain why the column of alcohol in a thermometer rises I
note that the substance it is in contact with has become hotter.
This increase in temperature causes an expansion of the alcohol in
the closed tube of the thermometer, and thus a rise in its level. But
to ascertain that the substance has become hotter I require a thermometer. If I employ an alcohol thermometer to establish this initial
fact, my explanation will be open to the criticism that it presumes what
it sets out to explain. More seriously, without an alternative means of
measuring temperature, say a mercury thermometer, a bimetallic bar,
or a gas diffusion thermometer, I will be unable to test, correct, and
improve my measurements of heat by the use of an alcohol thermometer
and so will be unable to make improving predictions about the effects
of changes in temperature, effects like changes in state, or electrical
resistance, and so on. And without alternative measures of temperature
I will be unable to relate any regularities about the relation between
heat and linear expansion in a closed tube to the rest of thermodynamics.
Indeed, the rest of thermodynamics would have been undiscoverable
without alternative means of measuring what an alcohol thermometer
measures by linear expansion in a closed tube.
The situation with respect to the intentional variables of social science
is identical and has been long recognized. The recognition that intentional variables need nonintentional anchors if an intentional science
is to improve beyond the level of commonsense ''folk psychology'' has
long been discussed as the ''problem of other minds.'' The suggestion
that when detached from behavior the intentional variables are
cognitively empty, theoretically barren, or methodologically suspect,
that we have no good grounds to attribute such states to others, is the
real force of philosophical skepticism about our knowledge of other
minds. The need to anchor the intentional in the nonintentional
spawned behaviorism. Unfortunately, behaviorism, even of the most
sophisticated sort, cannot provide the connections to the nonintentional
that are required. No matter what the setting, no mere movement of
the body can reveal a desire unless we already know a person's relevant
beliefs; no mere movement of his body can reveal a belief unless we
already know his relevant desires. So any definition of a desire will have
to mention beliefs, and any definition of a belief will have to mention
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desires. Definitions free of such intentional residues will not correctly
identify paradigmatic beliefs, desires, and actions that folk psychology
can identify. But such nonintentional definitions are just what
behaviorism demands.

B

ehaviorism's failure should come as no surprise. It is foreordained
in the fact that intentional statements have the logical property
of forbidding otherwise innocent substitutions, while any statement about mere movement permits all such substitution without provoking a change in truth or falsity . Therefore any nonintentional definition of the intentional was bound to leave something crucial out. The
only alternative to behaviorism as a way of anchoring mental states to
nonintentional ones is a neuroscientific reduction: the idea that we
should be able to find the brain states that constitute states of belief
and desire. Although locating such brain states will be of no practical
use in the identification of intentional states, it will provide a
theoretically possible way to check our ordinary attributions, and perhaps
even to improve them in artificial, clinical situations. In this respect,
a neurophysiological approach to mental states would be like a highly
complicated and inconvenient thermometer which cannot replace our
ordinary ones in any practically important context, but which provides
theoretical reassurance that we can in principle test and correct the
alcohol thermometer's accuracy. Unfortunately, neuroscience has
revealed no brain states that march in lockstep together with mental
states. At the level of detail on which neuroscience currently operates,
there are no changes in the brain or parts of the brain that seem to
vary at all systematically with changes in the mental states that experimental subjects report. Even if someone were to report the required
parallelism, the gulf between nonintentional brain states which can be
described in any of an indefinite number of ways and intentional mental states for which there are only privileged descriptions will remain
to be explained.
The upshot is that there is no way to break out of the intentional
circle of terms we employ to describe and explain human action and
its causes . Both in ordinary life and in social science the variables we
cite to explain behavior are understood by ostension, by pointing to
paradigm cases of such behavior by human beings in circumstances that
make their behavior intelligible from our own individual perspectives .
And when we explain the behavior of monkeys, Martians, and machines
as the outcome of intentional processes, we make such intentional attributions to them on analogy with the paradigm of human actions,
the behavior of Homo sapiens. This conclusion is no criticism of such
claims, nor does it preclude our someday giving new, nonintentional
behavioral definitions for such expressions as desire, belief, and their
cognates. Such definitions would allow us to make attributions of belief,
say, to nonhumans, on nonanalogical grounds. But it would remain
to be seen whether, so defined, 'belief picked out a natural kind; that
is, was scientifically fruitful. What is more, the use of such definitions
for our mental states would be tantamount to surrendering the belief
that humans engage in actions, as opposed to mere movements, that
we are agents, as opposed to mere patients of change . Such redefinition would change the subject matter of social science from human action to the topography of the displacement of human bodies. In short,
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any attempt to circumvent premise (2) by redefming intentional states
runs afoul of premise (1), the claim that the social sciences are all
resolutely intentional. This premise, coupled with the special logical
peculiarities of intentional statements, commits us firmly to the conclusion that the definitions of intentional states must resort to their exemplification by Homo sapiens. 3
Premises (3) and (4): Homo sapiens is a species, but species names are
not kind terms; they are the names of restricted, particular objects

Premise (3) of my argument needs little discussion. Homo sapiens
is a biological species, like Felis domesticus, Canis fomzlans, and Didus
ineptus (the Dodo bird). But Premise (4) constitutes one of the most
important contemporary conceptual revisions in biology and its
philosophy. I shall outline three of the reasons that biologists and
philosophers have increasingly come to view particular species as
spatiotemporally restricted particulars. If I can convince the reader to
embrace this view the crux of my argument will have been established.
One indication that species terms do not name classes or kinds or
organisms is the demise of essentialism in the biologist's notion of a
species. Essentialism is the hypothesis implicit in biological classification that there is a small set of properties distinctive of all the members
of a species, a set of morphological features, or perhaps a genetic feature
(like number or kinds of chromosomes or genes) that causally explains
why they are its members. If this view is correct, species are natural
kinds, for there exists a generalization about the universal manifestation of all these properties by all members of the species . The trouble
with the hypothesis of essentialism is that there just does not seem to
be any such set of explanatory traits common and peculiar to the
members of any species. Developments in evolutionary and genetic
theory have shown that variation, even among the most central traits,
is not only possible but also predominant. There is no single property
which can be deemed natural, normal, or typical, and variation around
a statistical mean is not to be construed as the result of disturbances
and perturbations deflecting members of a species away from the
mean. 4 Genetics has done away with the contrast between the
''specimen'' and the ''sport.'' But this denial of essentialism is tantamount to the claim that species are not natural kinds. If they are kinds,
they must be of the sort which, like the ordinary term ''fish,'' fail to
carve nature at the joints.
But species are not kinds at all, either natural or artificial. What they
are has been explained by a second, independent development in
biological theory. Over fifteen years ago Michael Ghiselin reached the
conclusion that species can only be particular objects, albeit scattered
ones. His conclusion is coming to be accepted by the most prominent
biologists of our time. Ghiselin argued that the theory of evolution and
the behavior of species require them to be such individual scattered
objects. Organisms are not the instances of a species; they are its constitutents, its parts. As Ghiselin puts it: "Species are like galaxies and
Homo sapiens is like the Milky Way." 5 The general concept of
'species' is the concept of a kind, a type, but its instances, Homo sapiens, Didus ineptus, Cygnus olor, are not themselves further subtypes,
the way triangle is a subtype of plane polygon. Species terms name par11
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ticular things; just as 'the Eiffel Tower' names a tower, and not a type
of tower. It is what species do which makes them individual, spatiotemporally distributed objects. The most obvious thing they do, according
to the theory of natural selection, is change: Species evolve, whereas
kinds do not change, as Plato argued.

T

he actual number of items designated by a kind term, like a
chemical element name, can change from empty to indefinitely
large and back again to empty. But the Dodo bird, Didus
ineptus, is not a kind with a temporarily empty membership. It is extinct, something no one would say about an element (such as element
109, which has no instances at the moment). The species Didus ineptus
went out of existence. Should a new population of birds arise, wholly indistinguishable from the Dodo bird, no biologist would consider them
instances of the species Didus ineptus: Since the original species is extinct, the branch of the phylogenetic tree on which it was a node ended
with its extinction. The new population would have to be on another
branch, would be the product of a different course of evolution, and
therefore would be a different species. In addition, the lines of descent
whose evolution is explained by the theory of evolution manifest the
properties of things and not of kinds . Not only do they come into existence and go out of it, they divide and they merge, just as individual
organisms do. Just as binary fission makes two organisms out of one,
geographical isolation can divide the line of descent that constitutes
a species and keep the two branches separate long enough so that,
despite their similarities, they will constitute two species, not one .
Similarly, two species may merge and create a third . The whole evolutionary phenomenon of speciation is most clearly intelligible on this
view of species as individuals.
There is another set of arguments for this view of species as individuals: Only by so viewing them can we correctly understand the
hierarchy of laws and theories in biology. Philosophers have leveled three
claims against biology: that it has no laws, or that its laws are far gappier and never likely to approach the universality and integration of
physical laws, or that the leading explanatory theory of biology, the
theory of natural selection, has no predictive content and may perhaps
be a grand tautology.6 This litany of charges rests on the assumption
that particular species must figure in biological laws at some level of
generality or other. But if this assumption is wrong, these charges are
wrong; if species name individuals, the most we can expect is to find
laws about all species. According to premise 5, no spatiotemporally particulars can figure in general laws.
The philosopher's assertion that biology has no laws rests on the supposition that such laws must at least include generalizations about all
members of a given species. The accompanying complaint that biology
can have no laws because its rough generalizations about groups or kinds
of species cannot be improved or upgraded to exceptionlessness rests
on the supposition that species are natural kinds. Both suppositions are
false. Since species are not kinds, natural or otherwise, there can no
more be laws about species than there can be laws mentioning the Eiffel Tower or the Mona Lisa or the family Medici or groups composed
of them. The laws of biology begin not at the level of particular species,
or even at the level of groups of species. They begin at the level of all

https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol4/iss2/9

6. The first charge originated in
). ). C. Smart's Philosophy and

Scientific Realism (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1959).
The second is found in David
Hull, Philosophy of Biology
(Englewood Cliffs , N .). : Prentice·
Hall, 1974). The third has a host
of proponents, notably Karl
Popper.

Since Homo sapiens is
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are restricted particular
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species. At this level, statements about species will be deducible
theorems of the fundamental laws of evolution. On the other hand,
because the theory of evolution is a set of general laws, it cannot make
claims about particular individuals, say species evolving on a particular
planet during a particular time. The theory of evolution must never
be confused with the history of evolution on this planet. It must be
able to explain this evolution, provided we add enough details about
the starting point and the environmental forces . But the theory itself
must describe a mechanism that can operate across the universe if it
is to constitute a body of natural laws. Most attacks on the theory of
natural selection as unfalsifiable or bereft of predictive content rest on
the mistaken demand that this universal theory have consequences for
particular facts about particular species. Once we recognize that species
are individuals, the theoretical character of evolutionary theory, the real
hierarchy of findings, generalizations, laws, and theories, becomes clear.
Indeed the character of biology as a natural science, parallel in every
feature of generality to physics or chemistry, becomes clear.
Preliminary conclusions: To be successfully predictive, generalizations
must begin at the level of natural kinds

Intentionality, tied to
human behavior, is irredeemably particularistic; it can never
form the basis for
generalizations about
human behavior. Insofar as the social
sciences are based on
intentionality, they are
doomed to fat! in their
attempt to formulate
laws.

The last steps in my argument are easy to expound. If every species
is an individual, spatiotemporally restricted, scattered object, then the
term Homo sapiens can no more find its way into nomological
generalizations than the term ' Mona Lisa' can. Laws have a kind of
generality lacked by statements about particular objects; they cannot
refer to particular objects, places, or times if they are to retain their
explanatory power. And so there can be no laws about Homo sapiens,
nor any laws about properties distinctive of Homo sapiens. But this
means we can expect no laws about actions, beliefs, desires, or any of
their cognates-preference, expectation, fear, anxiety, hope, want,
dislike, or any other intentional term. For all such terms are tied conceptually to the notion of Homo sapiens. They are tied to it because
intentionality is anchored to paradigmatic human behavior. Thus, it
will not do to say that there may be laws about intentional systems,
including humans, certain higher primates, computers, possible extraterrestrials, and so on, on the ground that laws about intentional systems
in general do not mention any particular species. For regardless of how
widely intentionality may be attributed, it is always grounded on an
anthropomorphic analogy, on comparison to how Homo sapiens
performs.

In search of natural kinds
for the social sciences
Now at last we have an explanation of why the social sciences have
failed to find improvable generalizations. It does social scientists the
justice they deserve. For if it is correct, nothing in their methods or
their beliefs can be impugned as inferior to those of natural scientists .
Their error has been to believe that the natural kinds which describe
human behavior, and its causes, are intentional. This is a belief which
no one has seriously questioned since attempts to explain human
behavior began before Plato. (Indeed Plato's Phaedo ridicules the sugPublished by SURFACE, 1983
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gestion that the explanation of human action might not be intentional.)
But since intentionality is a spatiotemporally restricted property, it can
figure in no laws, and attempts to frame and improve generalizations
expressed in this idiom were doomed to failure from the outset.
We can now explain why social science has not really progressed since
Plato, while natural science has at an accelerating rate, in spite of the
growing complexity and experimental recalcitrance of its subject matter. In the natural sciences, the chief obstacle to advance was the fact
that the natural kinds of each science were not marked out by ordinary
language. Advance in natural science came through a growing awareness
that things are not to be divided up according to our ordinary conceptual scheme no matter how suitable it is for human intercourse. But
in the social sciences we have always thought we knew what the appropriate kind terms were for describing human behavior. If the intentional categories in which we characterize human behavior and its determinants were indeed natural kinds, social science would have been faced
with an inestimably easier task than the natural sciences. For we would
have possessed the natural kinds of human behavior since time immemorial, in contrast with physicists, who acquired their natural kinds,
or something like them, only four hundred years ago. But in the past
four centuries, physics has progressed so far that the failure of social
science has become the first item on the agenda of the philosopher of
social science. For given the potential conceptual advantage of the social
sciences, the contrast between the rates of progress in these two
disciplines becomes even more staggering than it otherwise seems.
All these mysteries disappear if the problem is just that social scientists have firmly held to a false belief about the natural kinds into which
human behavior falls, a belief so widespread, and so well entrenched,
that it is almost impossible to surrender it. The view that our behavior
constitutes action and that its causes are to be sought in the joint operation of desires and beliefs is not only at the foundations of all the social
sciences, it is also part and parcel of the view we take of ourselves as
agents, with responsibilities, obligations, opportunities, rights, and all
the other features that make us more than just creatures of biological
interest. For purposes of a social science with nomological potential we
must surrender this conception of ourselves as agents. (For all other purposes, of course, we may continue to employ it.)

I

f the intentional vocabulary with which we have hitherto described
human behavior and its determinants is the wrong one for any
attempt to uncover improvable generalizations in the social sciences,
what is the correct one? The question, What is the right typology of
natural kinds of human behavior? is an empirical one, not philosophical.
For, as I have said, deciding on the right descriptive network is tantamount to discovering the improvable generalizations on which scientific success rests. Still, there is more to be said than merely warning
social scientists off the sterile ground of intentional descriptions. And
this is where sociobiology comes in. It is our best bet in the search for
the natural kinds of human behavior.
It is our best bet because it is both the safest bet in the long run,
and the one most likely to pay off with interesting and improvable results
in the short run. The search for laws of human behavior is in effect
the search for the narrowest natural kinds under which that behavior
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can be subsumed. We are of course familiar with some of the natural
kinds that subsume human behavior: the categories and kind terms of
physics and chemistry . But these kinds are far too broad . They include
much behavior that is not even organic, let alone mammalian or human.
The known laws in which the natural kinds of physics figure tell us
nothing about human behavior. An attempt to frame laws distinctive
of human behavior in the kind vocabulary of physics would be foolish .
Among the natural kinds we already know of, that is, among the
kind terms of physics, chemistry, and biology, the narrowest natural
kinds under which human behavior is subsumed are those of biology .
These biological kinds include the concepts of ecology, population
biology, and the theory of evolution, as well as the vocabulary of functional biology and especially the neurosciences. These are the narrowest
natural kinds that we know human behavior to be subsumed under.
Of course, there may be narrower ones, but we do not at present know
of any. And since the only other candidates for such kinds are the intentional kinds of conventional social science, we can say with confidence
that there are no natural kinds of human behavior narrower than those
of evolutionary biology and the neurosciences . Even if there are natural
kinds that are narrower in their relevance for human behavior than those
of curent life science, they will have to be not just consistent with, but
also coherently interconnected with the evolutionary and neuroscientific kinds . For it is a feature of the natural kinds of all the sciences
that they are actively related to one another in a network of laws and
theories . Therefore our best guide to the shape which the narrowest
kind terms for human behavior will take is the conceptual space allowed
for them in the theories to which they must be the most closely connected: those of biology .
Sociobiology is nothing more or less than the application of this conclusion to the attempt to understand human behavior.

Sociobiology and the possibility
of generalizing about human behavior
Sociobiology is a very new subject, one which is far from having proved
its legitimacy through uncontestable explanatory and predictive success. For a long time to come much of its rationale will be negative :
It will be recognition of the failure of conventional social science that
attracts social scientists to sociobiology. But because its natural kinds
will be those of biology, not the intentional kinds of superseded human
(i .e., social) science, there will lurk the suspicion that sociobiology can
tell us little of what social scientists want to know. Much recent work
in sociobiology has been directed at allaying this suspicion. But these
attempts to show the relevance of sociobiology to the traditional agenda of concerns in the conventional social sciences involve a considerable
risk. They jeopardize the very features that provide sociobiology's advantage over the older disciplines: its freedom from the snares of intentional description .
These risks are aptly illustrated in the standards of success for
sociobiology established by one of its prominent exponents. In Genes,
Mind and Culture, the most well-known sociobiologist, E. 0. Wilson,
and his coauthor, Charles Lumsden, set out the following criteria for
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the success of sociobiology:
First, it must derive ngorous propositions that are the unexplained axioms of other theon'es in the social sciences. Second,
we require that it achieve a level ofpredictiveness and testabzlity
greater than that provided by other modes of explanation, or at
least that it subsume the exact phenomenological models of
disciplines such as economics and anthropology so as to make the
underlying assumptions identical. Finally, it must suggest new
questions and problems, as well as identifying previously unknown
parameters and laws to be woven into a network of venfiable explanations from genes through mind to culture. 7
Yet sociobiology cannot be expected to meet the first and second of
these three demands if it is to meet the third.
The first condition Wilson and Lumsden lay out requires in effect
that whatever underived laws are fundamental to the current social
sciences be shown to be derived laws of sociobiology, that is, that they
be propositions related to principles of evolutionary biology in roughly
the way the Pythagorean theorem is related to the five postulates of
Euclidean geometry. But if as I suggest there is nothing wonhy of the
name "underived law" in conventional social science, any theory which
implies the claims sometimes identified as the laws of economics, or
the general statements of social psychology, politics, or anthropology,
could only be saddled with their defects, defects that make sociobiology
seem attractive just because it is free of them. Additionally, any demand that sociobiology explain as its consequences the analytical
schemes of disciplines like structural anthropology that deny any interest in causal laws deprives sociobiology of any chance to discover
general laws. Finally, and most crucial, all the conventional human
sciences are intentional, either explicitly in the case of economics, or
implicitly in the case of functionalist sociology. Showing how the "unexplained axioms' ' of these disciplines exemplify the leading ideas of a
biological approach to human behavior would require the very entrenchment of intentionality that I have argued is impossible in a science of
human behavior. If intentional kinds are not natural, it cannot be required as a necessary condition of the adequacy of sociobiology that
it show them to be natural.
The second criterion Lumsden and Wilson set for sociobiology is that
of matching the explanatory and predictive powers of conventional social
science. They require that their theory attain increased power, "or at
least that it subsume the exact phenomenological models of [conventional social sciences] so as to make the underlying assumptions identical.'' But since these powers have proved to be negligible, any theory
can satisfy the second stricture on explanatory and predictive power.
And sociobiology cannot subsume theories in social science if it hopes
to transcend them.

7. Charles Lumsden and E. 0.
Wilson, Genes, Mind and Culture
(Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1981), p . 343.

S

ociobiological theory may stand a good chance of meeting the
third of Lumsden and Wilson's demands : the requirement of
scientific fertility. But only on the condition that its proponents
forgo the first and second requirements for success. Their theory may
well present new problems; it may well generate hypotheses about the
parameters and the laws governing human behavior. But it cannot do
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so unless it remains rigorously biological (and therefore nonintentional)
in its conceptual machinery. But remaining rigorously biological will
prevent sociobiological theory from answering many of the questions
about actual human behavior and its meaning that are the stock in trade
of conventional social science.
Questions about human behavior and its meaning have a life of their
own, independent of the answers proffered by the social scientist. They
are questions we ask in ordinary life about the causes and effects of
our own and others' intentional actions, past, present, and future; they
are also questions we strive to answer in order to gain or improve our
ability to predict the forces controlling human welfare for the purposes
of public and private policy.
Now if such questions are intentional, and if they do not have
nonintentional surrogates, the fact that sociobiology must be silent about
answers to them poses arresting consequences: Either the study of human
behavior must be recognized as a theoretical activity without implications for serious practical problems of social life, its effectiveness and
improvement; or there is no real hope of acquiring an understanding
of individual and social welfare fine-grained enough to enable us to
understand and improve social life. In the former case, sociobiology
leaves a vacuum that an intentional approach to human behavior will
continue to attempt to fill, no matter how fumly it is stigmatized as
scientifically barren. In the latter case we must reconcile ourselves to
very narrow restrictions on the degree to which we can apply our
knowledge to any reliably expectable improvements in social arrangements whatsoever. The choice we may face is roughly between permanent frustration and overwhelming pessimism.

F

rom a purely theoretical stance it is easy to let the chips fall where
they may. One could conclude from the fact that there are no improvable regularities about human behavior, save those of
neurology and population biology, that there is no scientific basis on
which to arrange improvements and forestall deterioration in social life.
But this pessimism is simply too unattractive to withstand more optimistic visions of our powers to understand and improve social life.
The opponents of sociobiology have attempted to tar it with the brush
of such pessimism, attributing to its exponents a commitment to
"biological determinism," according to which social life, as we currently describe it, like all other biological phenomena, is fixed and unchangeable by human intervention no matter how theoretically informed . This is a view which sociobiologists do not embrace; indeed, if I
am correct, it is one they cannot embrace since they are committed to
agnosticism about the understanding of human behavior intermediate
between the individual brain's effects on the body and the forces of
natural selection on the human population.
If sociobiology is to survive as a subject of more than theoretical interest, and if it is to displace the intentional sciences as a repository
for knowledge that claims to be socially useful, it will have to show
that, for all its neutrality about human action, it has socially significant findings to report about the aggregation of individual actions into
biological populations. It will have to find nonintentional surrogates
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for our current agenda of questions about the forces which affect human
welfare for better or for worse. This is the sternest test that sociobiology
will have to pass. But it is not one that sociobiology can be expected
to meet immediately. Instead, the theory must be given a chance to
develop in directions dictated by the tactics of scientific research, and
not practical application. For unless it is allowed to develop in this purely
theoretical way, it can hold out no more hope in explanation or application than the disciplines which we would have it supplant.8

https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol4/iss2/9

8. I am deeply indebted to
Jonathan Bennett for extended
comments on and considerable improvements in the form of this
essay .

18

